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Abstract—Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS)
infrastructure in civil aviation must evolve as fast as possible to
cope with all challenges posed by the growth of the worldwide
population, globalization and the demand for more and more
mobility worldwide. Analogue systems are replaced by digital
means, automation is becoming much more important to handle
new entrants in the air traffic system, spectrum saturation must
be solved by introducing digital systems and the safety and
security of the safety critical infrastructure surrounding civil
aviation must be constantly updated to support the ever-growing
complexity of the system. As one of the Future Communication
Infrastructure (FCI) candidates we introduce LDACS as the
very first true integrated CNS system worldwide. In previous
works we have already analyzed its cybersecurity and developed
an architecture with corresponding algorithm and proofed the
improvement of the cybersecurity due to our security addi-
tions. Here we implement the LDACS cybersecurity architecture
and evaluate the impact of introduced security overhead on
the LDACS system. We conclude that the proposed protection
mechanisms successfully mitigate previously identified risks and
only add minor time, data and computation overhead on top of
the LDACS protocol stack, making the security solutions a good
candidate to be included in the SESAR wave 2 updated LDACS
specification.
Index Terms—LDACS, Cybersecurity, FCI, Digital Datalink,
Security Architecture
I. INTRODUCTION
In its latest Challenges of Growth study EUROCONTROL
estimates that civil air traffic will grow by a significant rate
of 84% until 2040. Under this estimation it is expected that
legacy Air Traffic Management (ATM) systems will surpass
their capacity limits [8].
Saturation of the VHF band, spectrum depletion, new
entrants such as drones in the air space, new technologies
enabling automatized transportation of goods or people and
with the growth of the entire population and thus an increased
need for transportation are challenges that must be solved to
cope with the growth [8], [31], [33]. One answer to enable
quicker, faster and safer handling of air traffic participants
is to successfully conduct the transition from analogue to
digital communication in worldwide ATM for Communication
Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) systems [32].
With the Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR)
program of the EU and its counterpart NextGEN in the US,
several new digital aeronautical communication technologies
Fig. 1. Future Communications Infrastructure (FCI) [26]
are currently under development [8], [33]. The main goal of
both is to develop enabling technologies to cope with the
expected air traffic growth. These technologies shall make
more efficient use of the limited aeronautical spectrum by
transitioning from analogue voice to digital data communi-
cation [32]. Candidates for the Future Aeronautical Com-
munication Infrastructure (FCI) are AeroMACS for airport
communications, SatCOM for remote domains, and LDACS
(L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System) for
long-range terrestrial aeronautical communications system.
Figure 1 illustrates where these candidates are envisioned to be
located. LDACS is developed in Europe and currently under
standardization by the International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation (ICAO). LDACS, as terrestrial digital wireless com-
munication system, enables communication, navigation and
surveillance at the same time and by that it is the world’s
first true integrated CNS system [26]. The communication
capabilities of LDACS consist of two parts: (1) the Air-Ground
link for long-range terrestrial communication and (2) a link for
Air-Air communications currently developed by DLR.
In this paper we focus on the Air-Ground link. It ensures
safety and regularity of flight and is based on technologies
used in the 3G and 4G mobile phone network [29]. It has
been adapted for safety critical infrastructure requirements
and shall be deployed as an inlay system in the L-band
next to the Distance Measurement Equipment (DME) as
illustrated in Figure 3 [1], [25]. With the augmentation of
Fig. 2. Frequency assignment for LDACS at WRC 2007, next to DME
analogue systems by digital substitutes and the related trend
towards an increased autonomous data processing as justified
in [32], LDACS requires a thorough cybersecurity analysis
and cybersecurity architectural design [20]. The envisioned
analysis and design should be similar to the ones used in
3G, 4G, or AeroMACS [5], [11].
In [1], [19], [20] a preliminary draft of a a cybersecurity
architecture for LDACS was justified and presented. In these
references it was clearly stated that essential requirements
were imposed by the aeronautical spectrum environment (e.g.,
reduced spectrum bandwidth and limited data rates). In order
to develop a successful cybersecurity solution for LDACS,
existing security protocols and algorithms had to be analyzed
in terms of resource consumption and compatibility. Thus, this
paper presents a comparison of investigated security protocol
implementations for LDACS. Further, simulations were done
in order to estimate the additional overhead security brings
to the current LDACS protocol. Initial results during flight
trials show that overhead is negligible compared to the security
improvement in the protocol itself.
This paper is structured as follows: Section II presents basic
knowledge of LDACS before the new LDACS’s cybersecu-
rity architecture is introduced in Section III. Implementation
details with focus on software simulations of LDACS are
presented in Section IV. The gained results are explained in
Section V before concluding the paper in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND ON LDACS
The L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System
(LDACS) is the terrestrial data link in the Future Commu-
nications Infrastructure (FCI). In 2007 the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and EUROCONTROL started a joint
investigation on existing technologies to investigate if any
technology could fulfill the demands of growing ATM in the
future. In short, the answer was no and, thus, sparked the
development of LDACS [7].
A. System Characteristics
The realized LDACS has its origin in merging parts of
the B-VHF [3], B-AMC [24], [27], TIA-902 (P34) [16], and
WiMAX IEEE 802.16e technologies [6]. In 2007 the spectrum
for LDACS was allocated at the World Radio Conference
(WRC). It was decided to allocate the spectrum next to DME,
resulting in an inlay approach between the DME channels
for LDACS as illustrated in Figure 3. Furthermore, LDACS
uses LTE/4G-like technology (e.g., Orthogonal Frequency-
Division Multiplexing) (OFDM) to remain highly flexible and
scalable and efficient in coding, supporting adaptive coding
Fig. 3. Inlay approach for LDACS in between the DME bursts
Fig. 4. Cell planning for LDACS
and modulation. Additionally, it applies (Frequency Division
Duplexing (FDD), because of the limited bandwidth available
with the inlay approach and a cellular communications concept
(cf. Figure 4, where each LDACS Station consists of GSC &
GS). Besides all these, LDACS supports seamless handovers,
data and voice transmissions, Quality-of-Service (QoS), has
a navigation and surveillance extension and an air-to-air link
is currently being developed. Most of those points will be
clarified in the next subsections. Due to the allocation next
to DME, LDACS will be deployed using an inlay approach
between the DME channels.
B. Communication Functionality
LDACS was especially designed for Air Traffic Control
(ATC) and ATM applications like Controller Pilot Data Link
Communications (CPDLC), Automatic Dependent Surveil-
lance - Contract (ADS-C), full 4D trajectories exchange and
real-time weather information. It is envisioned that Ground
Based Augmentation System (GBAS) functionality will be
provided via LDACS in the future as well. The underly-
ing enabler for all those applications are the main LDACS
parameters listed in Table I. Thus, LDACS covers current
Aeronautical Operational Control (AOC) and also future
applications, enables new concepts (e.g., sectorless ATM) and
has at least 50 times more net capacity than VHF Data
Link (VDL) Mode 2. [9]
TABLE I
MAIN PARAMETERS FOR LDACS
Number of sub carriers 64 (50 used)
Bandwidth 625 / 488 kHz
Subcarrier spacing 9.765625 kHz
OFDM symbol duration 102.4 µ
Guard interval (4.8 + 12.8) µ
Net data rate 550 kbits - 2.6 Mbit/s
C. Entities
Aircraft Station (AS), Ground Station (GS) and Ground
Station Controller (GSC) form the basic LDACS network. As
mentioned in 512 aircraft can be served by one GS where
the GS sends a continuous data stream in the Forward Link
(FL) to the AS. The Reverse Link (RL) consists of individual
bursts of data from each AS to GS. This means, for every RL
communication the AS first needs to request the respective re-
source allocation within its cell from the GS before being able
to send. Both FL and RL communication, including user and
control data, is done via the air gap over the radio link between
AS and GS. On the ground a GSC is responsible for serving
several GSs, forming an LDACS sub-network with its LDACS
internal ground network infrastructure. The GSC is linked to
the LDACS access network, which in turn is linked to the
Air/Ground LDACS router, being now the direct connection to
the ground network. The aeronautical ground network (previ-
ously the Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN))
is used for example by Air traffic Network Services Providers
(ANSP) and airlines to exchange AIR Traffic Service (ATS) or
Airline Operational Control (AOC) data between the ground
infrastructure and the aircraft.
D. Protocol Stack
Figure 5 shows the protocol stack of LDACS as imple-
mented in the AS and GS. It consists of the Physical Layer
(PHY), the Medium Access Layer (MAC), Voice Interface
(VI), Data Link Service (DLS) layer, LDACS Management
Entity (LME) and Sub-Network Protocol (SNP) layer. For
more details see Section III. The LDACS protocol stack is
located on Layer 1, 2 and 3 of the ISO/OSI model with
TCP/IP and IPv6 placed above the SNP. Below the SNP, data
is fragmented, prioritized and aggregated at the DLS layer.
[25] In order to communicate, LDACS uses several logical
channels in the MAC layer [25]:
• The GS announces its existence and several necessary
physical parameters in the Broadcast Channel (BCCH)
to incoming AS.
• The Random Access Channel (RACH) enables the AS to
request access to an LDACS cell.
• In the Forward Link (FL) the Common Control Channel
(CCCH) is used by the GS to distribute and grant access
to system resources.
• The reverse direction is covered by the Reverse Link
(RL), where aircraft need to request resources (in so
called resource allocation) in order to be allowed to
send. This happens via the Dedicated Common Control
Channel (DCCH).
• User data itself is communicated in the Data Channel
(DCH) on the FL and RL.
E. Extension Towards Navigation and Surveillance
Around 2011 the development of an extension towards
navigation in the sense of ”Alternative Positioning Navi-
gation and Time” (APNT) started [28]. The concept was
proven in theory in 2012 with simulations in 2013 show-
ing achievable accuracy of the aircraft position of around
4m [22]. Later in 2013 and 2015, flight trials confirmed
the localization accuracy of around 15m with demonstration
equipment, while in 2019 it was set out in the German
national project MICONAV [15] to test real-time position-
ing. All of the aforementioned steps confirm, that LDACS
can be used as a true navigation substitute for En-Route
(ENR) continental flights in case of DME or GPS outage.
In the long term, it must be considered whether LDACS
can truly replace legacy DME systems in the long-term.
There are also considerations to use LDACS for surveil-
lance such as Filip et al. showed in [10] using LDACS
as a passive radar substitute. However, the easier ap-
proach to implement surveillance into LDACS is to use
ADS-C and Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broad-
cast (ADS-B) and broadcast the position of an aircraft to
all neighboring planes and periodically send the position
of that aircraft via the RL down to the ground network.
As demonstrated in flight trials, LDACS can provide the three
vital components for civil air traffic, being communications,
navigation and surveillance, and is thus the world’s first true
integrated CNS system [26].
Fig. 5. Protocol Stack of LDACS
Fig. 6. Future extension of the LDACS A/G link by Air-Air (A/A) support,
enabling digital aeronautical communications without ground infrastructure
F. Extension Towards Aircraft Connectivity
The latest extension of LDACS – the Air-Air communi-
cation – covered in the German national project IntAirNet
[26]. The goal was to establish direct Air-Air communi-
cations between aircraft in communication range allowing
infrastructure-less aeronautical network for ad-hoc networks
between aircraft. With this in place it was envisioned to
ensure high-capacity secure, future Air-Air services, such
as ADS-B from aircraft to neighboring aircraft. Figure 6
depicts the overall idea illustrating how data can be trans-
ferred in ad-hoc network’s manner from one aircraft to other
stations (e.g., AS, GS).
III. LDACS’S CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECTURE
As described throughout Section II the following steps
towards LDACS were designed, implemented, and performed:
• The system design and optimization via simulations in-
cluding interference mitigation were the first step.
• The LDACS protocol design, starting from layer two in
the ISO/OSI stack, is done.
• Navigation functionalities of LDACS were included and
proofed and even flight-trialed.
• The LDACS system specification under the lead of
EUROCONTROL and SESAR has been completed.
• From there, the technology was transferred to the industry
(Frequentis, Rhode & Schwarz and LEONARDO).
• And lastly DLR performed an evaluation of the compat-
ibility with other L-band systems.
As test were successful standardization of LDACS itself
started in 2016 with ICAO in the working group ”ANB/AN:
DCIWG PT-Terrestrial” [18]. As an important step, the
LDACS Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS)
were agreed upon in October 2018. The plan for the future
is to release guidance material by the end of 2022 in order to
have LDACS applied 2024. Then LDACS will be the world’s
first realized true integrated CNS system.
Due to the fact that digitalization rises also in importance
in aeronautical communication [1], [30], [34], security threats
increase in parallel as pointed out in safety and security
analyses [12], [20]. These results forced DLR to address this
security issue for LDACS as soon as possible by drafting a
cybersecurity architecture for LDACS as detailed described in
[19]. As presented in [21] the SESAR 2020 Security Analysis
(SecRAM) process in 2018/2019 revealed new findings on
security threats (e.g., DoS on PHY layer, malicious operation
software) and recommended a first set of algorithms over-
coming them and improving LDACS. These recommendations
were integrated into LDACS’s cybersecurity architecture as
described in detail in [21].
A. Security Features and Message Flow
Figure 5 illustrates the LDACS stack and as it can be
seen in each stack component a feature for the realized
cybersecurity architecture is included. These are the following
seven functionalities [21]:
1) Protection of Control Channels
LDACS supports four channels dedicated for maintain-
ing the link only. We recommend to further investi-
gate lightweight cryptographic integrity and authentic-
ity protection for the Random Access (RA), Common
Control (CC) and Dedicated Control (DC) channel such
as Lightweight Message Authentication Code (LMAC)
[4] however the most important aspect is to protect the
Broadcast Control (BC) channel as before an aircraft
enters an LDACS cell it has to receive a beacon message
by the GS. For this reason we recommend using a
combined approach with digital signatures embedded in
the broadcast control message by the GS and the Timed-
Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA)
protocol [23].
2) Trust
Before establishing any kind of security and handing out
any security relevant information (e.g.,such as identifica-
tion information, cryptographic certificates) we have to
rely on an overall structure that enables us to establish
trust among entities. As LDACS and AeroMACS are
both FCI candidates with AeroMACS already strongly
deployed in China and an existing Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (PKI) in place [5] we can use the already established
mechanisms of an ICAO trust bridge, with Digicert host-
ing the root Certificate Authority (CA) in San Diego USA
and eonti being responsible for the rollout and distribution
of certificates for LDACS. Ongoing investigations are
undertaken checking applicability of newer approaches
on trust like Blockchain based PKI and Keyless Signature
Infrastructures with Zero Knowledge proofs for LDACS.
3) Entity Authentication
Signed Station-to-Station (STS) protocol [2] with prein-
stalled certificates on the end-entities is used for entity
authentication. Post-Quantum schemes and Quantum-Key
Distribution are under investigation.
4) Key Negotiation
The dual functionality of the STS protocol is used here.
5) Key Derivation
For session keys of arbitrary length with high entropy we
recommend the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key
Derivation Function (HKDF) [17].
6) Confidentiality Protection of Messages in Transit
AES-256 in Galois Counter Mode (GCM) is recom-
mended. It also covers integrity and authenticity protec-
tion of messages in transit with the same algorithm.
7) Integrity and Authenticity Protection of Messages in Tran-
sit
AES-256-GCM or a standard HMAC with hash-functions
of the SHA3 family approach are recommended.
Figure 7 illustrates which tasks in which order is performed
by which entity of the architecture linking it to the entities of
the LDACS’s protocol stack. GS and GSC securely set up a
connection. Now the GS is identified, mutually authenticated
and can start broadcasting its signed and TESLA protected
beacon for all AS to receive. After that when an AS comes
into the vicinity of a cell it can verify after the disclosure
time of the TESLA keychain, that the messages are authentic
and can verify the authenticity of the presumably broadcasting
GS via its signature. With negotiated parameters for wireless
transmission AS and GS can exchange messages and the AS
transmits its identification and authentication related informa-
tion to the GS which verifies them and if the verification is
successful, forwards them to the GSC. The GSC also verifies
the claim that the AS is actually the entity it claims to be and if
successful, starts transmitting the required STS parameters to
the AS. Now key negotiation, derivation and confirmation can
be done between AS and GSC. As soon as this succeeds secure
and, thus, encrypted, integer and authenticated communication
can commence among authenticated parties.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND SIMULATION
The security features and the respective message flow de-
scribed in Section III-A were implemented in a Python event-
based software simulation. The tool is capable of simulating
world-wide air traffic movements, management of ATC/AOC
data, cell coverage, and further features and is called FACTS2
[13]. FACTS2 is a service oriented simulation framework for
aeronautical communication system evaluation developed and
implemented by DLR. Due to the framework’s structure a task
separation becomes possible allowing natural parallelization
at service level. With this strategy architectural complexity of
software design stays low, and integration of existing software
tolls is fostered. A comparison between data from real flight
trials and data from the simulation showed, FACTS2 is able
to simulate air traffic nearly as good as in reality and, thus,
the best candidate to test the designed security features and
message flows for LDACS’s cybersecurity architecture.
A. Assumptions
For the final implementation of LDACS’s cybersecurity
architecture in the simulation tool the following assumptions
were made:
Fig. 7. Steps performed to gain security in LDACS
(A1) The actual computation time takes no time in the simula-
tion as it is negligible compared to the transmitting time
even for the smallest frame in LDACS.
(A2) LDACS implements an Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ)
protocol, thus if frames are lost due to simulated Bit-Error
Rate (BER) the data is retransmitted as specified by the
LDACS standard for acknowledged send mode.
(A3) The AS remain in the same range and, thus, the same
BER (Bit Error Rate) is used for all scenarios, even
though in reality the planes will approach the GS (signal
improves, BER is decreasing) and leave the LDCAS cell
(signal lessens, BER is increasing).
(A4) The packet generators use exponential distribution to
match the requested load on the link, however only
transmits dummy data of the actual length of real ATS
or AOC data.
(A5) Certificates for end-entities were already locally stored
and are not part of the STS message exchange to reduce
the overhead of security data.
(A6) Before starting with the actual description, it is important
to note that in our implementation the most trusted entity
is regarded as ”server” and the other one as ”client”. For
example if GSC and GS communicate, the GSC is the
server and the GS is the client. The resulting order of
trustworthiness is then GSC > GS > AS.
Fig. 8. Software implementation of the LDACS protocol with security additions
With the assumptions A1-A6 in place the existing simula-
tion tool was extended for the evaluation of the message flow
within the LDACS protocol stack. The extension includes the
following and results in the data flow shown in Figure 8:
• There is a GSC, one GS, and up to 512 AS connecting
to that GS, which in turn is linked to the GSC.
• The message exchange between GSC, GS, and multiple
AS can be accurately depicted.
• Data packets are simulated by packet generators
(APP PACKET GENERATOR SNP) in 8 instead being
sent from Air Traffic Network Service Providers (ANSP)
or airlines in reality.
Important to know here, is that the general structure of
classes of the protocol stack and the interactions between
protocol layers are indications (ind) and requests (req), used
to send messages back and forth. Usually a class starts with
the initialization, summing up all required variables of that
class. Then all necessary functions are listed, among them
all req methods. Finally in a run() function, an infinite loop
continues to wait for indications pointed at that respective
entity and layer and, reacting to these indications, performs
a certain action. Thus, we get the event based simulation.
Each time a suitable message is received at a certain time, an
action is performed.
B. Value Settings
With the adapted protocols and the transition from in-
coming data packets from the IP Layer (IPv6) to the SNP,
we needed to adjust the STS protocol messages for the
designed key negotiation and entity authentication. As we
define the required certificates already to be stored upon the
LDACS communication devices, we do not need to include
these in the message exchange. Therefore, we can start with
the SignedClientHello message, which has the struc-
ture and parameters selected as listed in Table II. For the
ServerHelloKeyExchange message, depicted in Table
III, we integrated also parts of the key exchange message to
reduce the total amount of exchange packets. Regarding the
two KeyExchangeFinished packets (cf. Tables IV and
V) we follow STS message exchange without changes. These
four messages of table II - table V are exchanged between the
NME of the GSC and the LMEs of AS and GS as depicted
in Figure 8.
In the implementation we work with so called Signed
beacons. Hence, for securing parts of the data channels, we
suggest putting a signature in the BC slots in the BCCH
channel together with the TESLA protocol, thus allowing
incoming aircraft on the first receipt of a GS announcement
the verification of their identity. The corresponding packet
structure is shown in Table VII, with Figure 8 showing, this
TABLE II
SIGNEDCLIENTHELLO MESSAGE
Field Size Description
TYPE 4 bit SignedClientHello
ID 12 bit Packet Identifier
UA 28 bit Unique Address - Packet Sender
Identifier
PRIO 4 bit Priority of packet
RNC 256 bit Random Number Client
SIGN 128 bit Signature
GS VAL 1 bit Field containing information of GS
verification status of AS.
TABLE III
SERVERHELLOKEYEXCHANGE MESSAGE
Field Size Description
TYPE 4 bit ServerHelloKeyExchange
ID 12 bit Packet Identifier
UA 28 bit Unique Address - Packet Sender
Identifier
PRIO 4 bit Priority of packet
RNS 256 bit Random Number Server
G 2048 bit Generator for cyclic group mod p
P 224 bit Prime Number for cyclic group
GX 2048 bit gx, x chosen in secret by sender
TABLE IV
CLIENTKEYEXCHANGEFINISHED MESSAGE
Field Size Description
TYPE 4 bit ClientKeyExchangeFinished
ID 12 bit Packet Identifier
UA 28 bit Unique Address - Packet Sender
Identifier
PRIO 4 bit Priority of packet
GY 2048 bit gy , y chosen in secret by sender
ENCSIGGYGX 256 bit Signature of gy , gx encrypted with
common key derived from message
key = (gx)ymod p exchange.
TABLE V
SERVERKEYEXCHANGEFINISHED MESSAGE
Field Size Description
TYPE 4 bit ServerKeyExchangeFinished
ID 12 bit Packet Identifier
UA 28 bit Unique Address - Packet Sender
Identifier
PRIO 4 bit Priority of packet
ENCSIGGXGY 256 bit Signature of gx, gy encrypted with
common key derived from message
key = (gy)xmod p exchange.
TABLE VI
SN PDU MESSAGE
Field Size Description
TYPE 4 bit ACK/UNACK/MGMT
PID 5 bit Packet ID
SC 3 bit Service Class
SAC 28 bit Subscriber Access Code
LEN 12 bit Octets PDU
USER DATA 844-12108 bit Payload (optionally en-
crypted)
MAC 128 bit Integrity Checksum
TABLE VII
TESLA PROTECTED SIGNED SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION BROADCAST
MESSAGE
Field Size Description
B TYPE 4 bit System Identification Broadcast
LEN 10 bit Length given in bit
GS SAC 12 bit GS Identifier - Identifier who sent
the packet
VER 3 bit Protocol Version
FLF 12 bit Forward Link Frequency
RLF 12 bit Reverse Link Frequency
MOD 1 bit User-/Cell-specific ACM
CMS 3 bit Coding and Modulation Scheme
EIRP 7 bit GS Equivalent Isotropic Radiated
Power
PAD 0 bit Reserved
CRC-8 8 bit Cyclic Redundancy Check
SIGN 128 bit GS Specific Signature
MAC 128 bit TESLA authenticated packet proof
TESLA KEY 128 bit TESLA key for respective interval
broadcast message can only be sent from the LME GS and is
received by the LME AS.
All incoming data from the network will be encapsulated
in so called SN PDUs. The packet structure and its pa-
rameters is depicted in Table VI and only exchanged, with
applied cryptographic mechanisms, between the SNPs of GSC
and AS - as shown in Figure 8.
With the described messages in place, a message exchange
can be performed enabling secure key negotiation, entity
authentication and finally the confidential, integrity protected
transmittance of user data.
V. EVALUATION
Before conducting flight trials we implemented the pro-
posed cybersecurity architecture in software simulations. First
evaluation of data showed promising results regarding the
following points which are part of the objectives mentioned
in the official LDACS SARPS (Standards and Recommended
Practices) by ICAO [18]:
1) For time overhead added by the entity authentication, key
agreement, negotiation and derivation, we wanted to show
that it takes less than two seconds to securely connect an
AS to the LDACS network.
2) Regarding data overhead by additional security we
wanted to use less than five percent of additional
user-data capacity.
A. Time Overhead by Security Additions
The time until an aircraft is authenticated by and to all other
entities and until AS and GSC have a key, can be precisely
measured when having many aircraft enter the cell and perform
all the required operations. So we do not need actual data
packets to be exchanged as we are focused on the first
seconds of communication. We tested with a total number of
500 AS, each entering with two seconds of time margin
to each other.
Fig. 9. Duration of AS, GS and GSC mutual authentication, key negotiation and secure connection establishment time
Further we checked for different BERs, to measure the
impact of the BER on performance. BER steps were chosen
according to previous work [14], ranging from 0, 10−6,
10−5 and10−4. However the BER should only start to be
noticeable around a BER of 10−5. LDACS is designed for
a BER up to 10−4 to work and on average, a BER of
10−6 is assumed [13]. With 500 ASs in place we observed
that the FL-/RL-Load, the size of SN PDU and the ac-
knowledged transmission were either constant or irrelevant
values and, thus, we decided to altered only the following
parameters for additional trials:
• Simulation time = 500 seconds
• BER varies between the values 0, 10−6, 10−5, and 10−4
Finally, we ended up with four simulation scenarios. Each
one was performed ten times in order to receive reproducible
results. We investigated how long the time spans are for
(i) GS and AS connection, (ii) GSC and AS connection,
(iii) GSC has derived the AS-GSC master key, and
(iv) AS has derived the AS-GSC master key and key con-
firmation was performed in respect to the different BER.
After those four steps were successfully performed key deriva-
tion takes place and a secure session can be established,
which takes almost zero processing time thus we neglect
the derivation times.
As the received measurements illustrated in Figures 9a
and 9b prove, a BER of 0 or 10−6 has little effect on the
overall connection time for establishing a secure link. With
an increasingly bad channel and thus a higher BER of 10−5,
Figure 9c shows that on average the overall connection time
remains braodly the same as with lower BER, however the
longest connection times take already 50% more time than
with 10−6 BER. In Figure 9d, we can see that LDACS was
designed to operate up to a maximum of one bit error per
10,000 bit and, thus, the very high connection and security
exchange times due to retransmissions and waiting times with
a BER of 10−4 are not surprising. The most important detail
here is, that a secure LDACS link can still be established under
such bad channel conditions.
Fig. 10. Security data overhead on top of user data
B. User Data Overhead by Security Additions
Security data overhead is introduced by having additional
authentication and key negotiation packets in the system
and by using Message Authentication Codes (MAC) of 128
bit attached to data packets. Also additionally required re-
transmission depending on the BER due to larger or more
packets due to security data overhead can have an impact on
security data overhead. We use the following fixed parameters
for our simulation:
• Number of AS is 100,
• 100 kbit/s for average FL/RL data throughput for all AS
in one LDACS cell,
• 500 seconds simulation time,
• acknowledged transmission mode,
• BER = 10−5 to simulate ten times worse conditions than
the average assumed BER, and
• MAC size of 128 bit
We alter only the size of the SN PDUs between 128
byte, 256 byte, 384 byte, 512 byte, 640 byte, 768 byte, 896
byte, 1024 byte, 1152 byte,1280 byte, 1408 byte, and 1536
byte. Assuming on average, every 500 seconds a new key
would have to be negotiated, as the AS leaves one GS range
and enters another, we receive the security data overhead in
dependence of the SN PDU size.
In Figure 10 we see that depending on the size of SN PDU
packets the security overhead can range from 14% to 1%. This
mostly results from the fix size of MACs attached to user data
packets. To achieve our goal of less than 5% security data
overhead, we recommend only using user data packets with a
size larger than 256 bytes. Also we see that the average re-
authentication time for moving nodes such as aircraft of 500
seconds only puts another 0.8% more security data on the link.
Reducing this and the sizes of MACs will be critical to further
reduce the security overhead on LDACS.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this paper we stated that security support is essential for
future air traffic and related ATM. Therefore, we introduced a
cybersecurity architecture for LDACS offering basic security
functionalities (e.g., protection of control channels, trust. key
negotiation) as described throughout Section III. Before the
MICONAV flight campaign the designed and implemented
solution was successfully tested within the FACTS2 simulation
framework. With the gained results from several simulation
runs we could prove that with the current implementation the
overhead introduced by key exchange messages and Message
Authentication Codes (MAC) applied to data packets is nearly
negligible. We beat the two second mark for time overhead
with the 95% percentile up until a BER of 10−5 and the five
percent mark for data overhead with SN PDU sizes larger
than 256 bytes. At a realistic Bit Error Rate (BER) of 10−5,
the average connection time is 1.054 seconds. Assuming an
internal data packet size of SN PDUs larger than exactly
320 byte, we also beat the five percent margin, making the
proposed security architecture viable.
As this work also presented a first proof-of-concept for
the viability for the LDACS cybersecurity architecture, it will
proof to be valuable input for the SESAR wave 2 specification
of LDACS prior to its finalization and deployment as the
terrestrial datalink for civil aviation.
During the MICONAV flight campaign additional data
(e.g., evaluation on broadcast security of LDACS, use of
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) in digital aeronautical
datalinks) was collected that will be further investigated
and evaluated. In order to improve LDACS’s cybersecurity
architecture further we will have a closer look at post-
quantum cryptography, a standalone trust solution for LDACS
and additional protection for control messages and physical
layer protection against jamming, spoofing and interfering
with the datalink.
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